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Armed Attack and Self-Defense 
T he general prohibition of the use offorce in the relations. between States constitutes the cornerstone of modem international law. 1 It is currently 
embedded both in the Charter of the United Nations [Article 2(4)2] and in cus-
tomary intemationallaw (which has consolidated under the impact of the Char-
ter).3 Indeed, the International Law Commission has identified the prohibition 
of the use of inter-State force as "a conspicuous example" of jus cogens4 (i.e., a 
peremptory norm of general international law from which no derogation is 
perrnitted5). The Commission's position was cited by the International 
Court ofJ ustice in the Nicaragua case of 1986, 6 and in two Separate Opinions 
the peremptory nature of the proscription of the use of inter-State force was 
explicitly emphasized? 
The correct interpretation of Article 2(4) of the Charter subsequent to the 
Nicaragua Judgment is that there exists in international law today "an absolute 
prohibition of the use or threat offorce, subject only to the exceptions stated 
in the Charter itsel£"8 The only two exceptions spelled out in the Charter are 
collective security pursuant to a Security Council decision (by virtue espe-
cially of Article 42 9) and individual or collective self-defense (consistent with 
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Article 5110). This chapter will focus on self-defense, namely, forcible counter-
measures put in motion by States acting on their own (individually or collec-
tively), in the absence of a binding Security Council decision obligating or au-
thorizing them to behave in such a fashion. 
In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, the right of self-defense can 
only be invoked in response to an "armed attack." The choice of words in Arti-
cle 51 is deliberately restrictive. The phrase "armed attack" is not equivalent to 
"aggression" (a much broader and looser term, used, e.g., in Article 39 pertain-
ing to the powers of the Security Councilll). An armed attack is actually a partic-
ular type of aggression. This is borne out by the French text, which speaks of 
"une agression armee. " The expression "armed attack" denotes the illegal use of 
armed force (i.e., recourse to violence) against a State. 
For an illegal use offorce to acquire the dimensions of an armed attack, a min-
imal threshold has to be reached. Since Article 2(4) of the Charter forbids "use of 
force" and Article 51 allows taking self-defense measures only against an "armed 
attack," a gap is discernible between the two stipulations.12 The gap is due to the 
fact that an illegal use of force not tantamount to an armed attack may be 
launched by one State against another, but then (in the absence of an armed at-
tack) self-defense is not an option available to the victim. Logically and pragmat-
ically, the gap has to be quite narrow, inasmuch as "there is very litde effective 
protection against states violating the prohibition of the use of force, as long as 
they do not resort to an armed attack. "13 If a victim State is barred from respond-
ingwith counter-force to force, this ought to be confined to the sphere ofappli-
cation of the ancient apothegm de minimis non curat lex. In other words, all that 
the gap conveys is that the illicit use of force has to be of sufficient gravity.14 
When the use of force is trivial-say, a few stray bullets are fired across a fron-
tier-no armed attack can be alleged to have occurred.15 In that case, there is no 
room for forcible counter-measures of self-defense. 16 By contrast, when the use 
offorce is of sufficient gravity, an armed attack is in progress even ifit is charac-
terized by small magnitude. Au fond, whenever a lethal result to human be-
ings-or serious destruction to property-is engendered by an illegal use of 
force by State A against State B, that use offorce will qualify as an armed attack. 
The right to employ counter-force in self-defense against State A can then be in-
voked by State B (and, as we shall see infra, also by State C). 
To better understand the legal position, it is necessary to distinguish between 
an armed attack, on the one hand, and an ordinary breach of international 
law-or even a mere unfriendly act-on the other. 
State A can commit an unfriendly act against State B without thereby being in 
breach of any binding norm of international law. Such unfriendly conduct by 
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State A is liable to upset State B. It may cause the latter psychological embarrass-
ment or even material harm in the political, diplomatic, or economic arena. Yet, 
as long as no breach of international law is committed, State B does not possess 
any legal standing (jus standI) for objecting to the conduct of State A. 
Acts that may highlight the phenomenon of unfriendly acts, carrying with 
them no connotations of infringement by State A ofinternationallaw, are: (i) re-
fusal to permit an official visit of State A by the Head of State B;i7 (ii) a notifica-
tion that a member of the diplomatic staff of State B accredited to State A is 
persona /lon grata; 18 (iii) the prohibition of the import of certain goods from State 
B into State A (absent treaty commitments to the contrary);19 and (iv) espionage 
carried out by clandestine agents of State A.20 The fact that, strictly speaking, all 
these activities-and similar ones in the same vein-are legal (albeit unfriendly) 
does not mean that State B is completely helpless in terms of potential response. 
State B may opt to indulge in "retorsion" by taking equally legai yet unfriendly 
steps (such as a reciprocal expulsion of diplomats sent by State A).21 
A breach of international law transcends unfriendliness, crossing the red line 
of illegality. If State A ignores the immunity from local jurisdiction enjoyed by 
duly accredited diplomatic agents of State B;22 if State A's trawlers fish in the ex-
clusive economic zone off the coast of State B;23 if State A fails to extradite a fu-
gitive from State B notwithstanding clear-cut obligations in a treaty concluded 
by them-State A will bear international legal responsibility vis-a.-vis State B. In 
keeping "vith the international law of State responsibility, "[t]he injured State is 
entitled to obtain from the State which has committed an internationally wrong-
ful act full reparation in the form of restitution in kind, compensation, satisfac-
tion, and assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, either singly or in 
combination. "24 
Seeking reparation, State B-as the injured party-may present a legal claim 
against State A before any international court or tribunal which may be vested 
"vith jurisdiction over the dispute. Alternative avenues are also open. State B is 
always free to bring the dispute with State A to the attention of the Security 
Council [under Article 35(1) of the Charter25]. The Council may then recom-
mend appropriate methods of adjustment [pursuant to Article 36(1)26] or even 
determine the existence of a threat to the peace (in compliance with the 
above-mentioned Article 39).27 Acting on its own, State B may also apply 
non-forcible reprisals against State A28 (e.g., by declining to extradite a fugitive 
from State A under the same treaty provision). A reprisal differs from retorsion in 
that the act in question (non-extradition) would have been illegal-in light of 
the treaty obligations postulated-but for the prior illegal act of State A.29 
Whichever channel of response is chosen by State B against State A, the 
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quintessential point is that, as a rule, the fact that State A incurs international re-
sponsibility towards State B does not create for State B a legitimate option to ini-
tiate force against State A. Even an ordinary violation of the UN Charter itself 
does not excuse response by force. 
The only time-consistent with the Charter-when State B (,vithout acting 
at the behest of the Security Council) may lawfully wield force against State A, in 
response to an illegal act by State A, is when that illegal act amounts to an armed 
attack and the counter-measures can be appropriately subsumed under the head-
ing of self-defense. 
Computer Network AHacks (CNAs) 
The scientific and technological revolution, which has rendered the com-
puter ubiquitous, has also "changed the scope and pace ofbattle."3o This is evi-
dent to all where the computer serves as an instrument of command, control, 
communications, and intelligence (not to mention simulation, surveillance, 
sensors, and innumerable other military purposes). But the modern computer 
can also become a weapon in itselfby being aligned for attack against other com-
puter systems serving the adversary. A "computer network attack" (CNA) can 
occur either in wartime-in the midst of on-going hostilities-or in peacetime. 
The former situation is governed by the jus in bello and does not come ,vithin the 
scope of the present paper. The question to be analyzed here is the latter. More 
specifically, the fulcrum of our discussion is whether a CNA mounted in peace-
time may be categorized as an armed attack, thus justifying forcible counter-
measures of self-defense in compliance with the jus ad bellum. 
A CNA is often defined inadequately as disrupting, denying, degrading, or 
destroying either information resident in a computer network or the network it-
sel£31 This definition is rooted in a presupposition that a CNA is no more than a 
device to counter the antagonist's electronic capabilities. Had the definition 
been legally binding-or had it factually mirrored the whole gamut of the tech-
nical capabilities of the computer-the likelihood of a CNA ever constituting a 
full-fledged armed attack would be scant. However, whereas CNAs recorded 
heretofore have admittedly been circumscribed to operations of intrusion and 
disruption, it would be extremely imprudent to extrapolate current restraints 
into the years ahead. A credible forecasting of future developments must start 
from the indisputable premise that potential CNAs (by feeding false messages 
into a target computer system) may also encompass grievous sabotage, designed 
to leave behind a trail of death and devastation through induced e:h"plosions and 
other malicious "malfunctions."32 
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The determination whether or not an anned attack has taken place-so as to 
justify response by way of self-defense-does not necessarily depend on the 
choice of weapons by the attacking party. The International Court of Justice 
aptly commented, in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion of 1996, that the 
provision of Article 51 does not refer to specific weapons; it applies to anyanned 
attack, regardless of the weapon employed.33 Of course, the detonation of 
weapons of mass destruction (say, nuclear warheads) makes it easier to stigmatize 
the strike as an anned attack. Still, what counts is not the specific type of ord-
nance, but the end product of its delivery to a selected objective. Mter all, even 
unsophisticated pernicious tools-like the poisoning of wells in a desert 
area-may give rise to exceedingly grave results. 
From a legal perspective, there is no reason to differentiate between kinetic 
and electronic means of attack. A premeditated destructive CNA can qualify as 
an anned attack just as much as a kinetic attack bringing about the same-or sim-
ilar-results. The crux of the matter is not the medium at hand (a computer 
server in lieu of, say, an artillery battery),34 but the violent consequences of the 
action taken. If there is a cause and effect chain between the CNA and these vio-
lent consequences, it is immaterial that they were produced by high rather than 
low technology. 
When a CNA emanates from within the territory of the same country in 
which the target is located (assuming that no foreign State is involved in the op-
eration and no a~empt is made to route the attack through a conduit abroad), 
this is a matter that in principle can-and should-be regulated by the domestic 
law of that country. Generally speaking, subject to few exceptions (see the next 
section), international law comes into play only at a point when the CNA turns 
into a cross-border operation. 
Even in a cross-border scenario, CNAs are not all of the same nature. It is nec-
essary to distinguish between four discrete rubrics of CNAs originating from 
State A and directed against State B, depending on whether they are unleashed 
by: (i) individual computer hackers who are residents of State A, acting on their 
own initiative for whatever personal motive (benign or otherwise) without any 
linkage to the government of State A; (ii) terrorists35 based in State A, acting on 
behalf of any chosen "cause" inimical to State B, unsupported by the govern-
ment of State A; (iii) terrorists overtly or covertly sponsored by the government 
of State A; and (iv) official organs-either military or civilian-of the govern-
ment of State A. 
The first two categories usually call for coercive action by the proper authori-
ties of State A itself, with a view to precluding or terminating hostile acts con-
ducted from within its territory by hackers or terrorists against State B. The 
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International Court ofJustice proclaimed, in the Corfu Channel case of1949, that 
every State is under an obligation "not to allow knowingly its territory to be 
used for acts contrary to the rights of other States. "36 In implementing this inter-
national obligation, State A should take resolute steps to suppress the perpetra-
tion of hostile activities from within its territory against State B-optimally by 
preventing these acts from materializing, but minimally by prosecuting offend-
ers after the acts have already been committed. If the government of State A fails 
to do what it is supposed to, State B (as we shall see infra) can take certain excep-
tional counter-measures unilaterally. 
When terrorists are sponsored by State A, they may be deemed "defacto or-
gans" of that State.37 "[T]he imputability to a State of a terrorist act is unques-
tionable if evidence is provided that the author of such act was a State organ 
acting in that capacity. "38 When State A chooses to operate against State B at one 
remove--pulling the strings of a terrorist organization (not formally associated 
with the governmental apparatus), rather than activating its regular armed 
forces-this does not diminish one iota from the full international responsibility 
of State A for the acts taken and their consequences, provided that "it is estab-
lished" that the terrorists were "in fact acting on behalf of that State."39 
The International Court of Justice, in the Nicaragua case of 1986, e).-plicitly 
held that an armed attack encompasses not only action by regular armed forces 
but also the employment of"irregulars."4o Granted, not every detail in this deli-
cate area is universally agreed upon. The majority of the Court in the Nicaragua 
Judgment added that the mere supply of arms (or providing logistical and other 
support) to armed bands cannot be equated \vith armed attack,41 whereas Judges 
Schwebel and Jennings sharply dissented on this point.42 Be it as it may, there is a 
consensus that when State A goes beyond logistical support and dispatches a ter-
rorist group to do its bidding against State B, State B can invoke self-defense 
against State A. 
In 1999, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia pronounced, in the Tadic case, that acts performed by mem-
bers of a military or paramilitary group organized by a State "may be regarded as 
acts of de facto State organs regardless of any specific instruction by the control-
ling State concerning the commission of each of those acts. "43 The Tribunal 
concentrated on the subordination of the group to overall control by the State. It 
opined that the State does not have to issue specific instructions for the direction 
of every individual operation, nor does it have to choose concrete targets.44 Ter-
rorists can thus act quite autonomously and still stay de facto organs of the con-
trolling State. 
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The most crucial flow of events stems from a CNA undertaken overtly by of-
ficial government organs. The intrusion of the organs of State A into the com-
puter systems of State B may have a whole range of purposes and outcomes, for 
instance: 
(i) Espionage. As indicated supra, espionage activities conducted by 
clandestine agents are merely unfriendly acts. In singular circum-
stances, official espionage is openly acknowledged by a State;45 the 
question whether the act can then be viewed as a violation ofinter-
national law is debatable.46 In any event, espionage per se does not 
constitute an armed attack. 
(ii) Disruption of communications and digitized services through the 
induced failure of computer systems, without causing human casu-
alties or significant destruction of property. This is a CNA, but 
since the act (whether merely unfriendly or a transgression of inter-
national law) does not entail sufficiendy grave consequences, the 
conclusion is the same. 
(iii) Fatalities caused by loss of computer-controlled life-support sys-
tems; an extensive power grid outage (electricity blackout) creating 
considerable deleterious repercussions; a shutdown of computers 
controlling waterworks and dams, generating thereby floods of in-
habited areas; deadly crashes deliberately engineered (e.g., through 
misinformation fed into aircraft computers), etc. The most egre-
gious case is the wanton instigation of a core-meltdown of a reactor 
in a nuclear power plant, leading to the release of radioactive mate-
rials that can result in coundess casualties if the neighboring areas 
are densely populated.47 In all these cases, the CNA would be 
deemed an armed attack. 
A salient point is that an excessive computer dependency creates a special 
vulnerability.48 The more technologically advanced-and, therefore, computer 
reliant-a State is, the more susceptible it is to a paralyzing CNA. Overall, State 
A may be less developed scientifically and technologically than State B. 49 Yet, 
the very advantage of State B becomes a debilitating burden once State A 
manages to penetrate State B's electronic defenses. This, writ large, is the 
scenario of a nuclear core meltdown. Through a CNA, State A-having no 
nuclear capability of its own-can in a sense "go nuclear" by exploiting the 
scientific and technological infrastructure of State B, thus turning the tables on 
the target State. State B, as it were, provides the nuclear weapon against itself (the 
weapon being triggered by agents of State A). 
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CNAs against Private Individuals and Corporations 
It must be appreciated that a computer system subjected to a CNA by State A 
need not belong to the government, or even to any semi-governmental agency, 
of State B. An attack may be carried out, e.g., inside US territory (or, for that 
matter, vessels flying the American flag and aircraft registered in the US) against a 
computer system operated by either a private individual or a non-governmental 
entity. The American situation is perhaps the most acute, inasmuch as public 
utilities in the US are privately owned, and, indeed, corporate America is the 
principal manufacturer of military equipment, naval platforms, and aircraft serv-
ing the American armed forces. But anyhow, it is immaterial whether the civil-
ian computer system under attack is operated by a civilian supplier or 
sub-contractor of the Department of Defense. Even if the CNA impinges upon 
a civilian computer system which has no nexus to the military establishment 
(like a private hospital installation), a devastating impact would vouchsafe the 
classification of the act as an armed attack. There is no immanent difference be-
tween a CNA and a kinetic attack targeting ordinary civilian objects \vithin the 
territory of State B. Needless to say, the bombing by State A of, e.g., an urban 
population center (apart from being unlawful per se under international human-
itarian law, by not being directed against a military objective50) constitutes an 
armed attack, albeit not a single member of the armed forces of State B is injured 
in the air-raid. The same rule is applicable to a CNA. 
Furthermore, a CNA-just like a kinetic use of force-by State A would 
qualify as an armed attack against State Beven if the computer system inside the 
territory of State B (including its vessels and aircraft) is operated by an individual 
or a private corporation possessing the nationality of State C. A corporation, on 
an analogy with an individual, has a distinct nationality (that of the State under 
the laws of which it was incorporated and in whose territory it has its registered 
office).51 But the foreign nationality of the corporate or individual operator of 
the computer system under attack is irrelevant from the perspective of State B, as 
long as the CNA is carried out within its territory. 
What happens when a CNA is inflicted by State A outside the territory of 
State B, but it affects a computer system operated by State B or one of its nation-
als (individual or corporate)? It goes without saying that a lethal kinetic strike 
against a governmental installation of State B stationed outside its territory, 
vessels, and aircraft-such as an embassy of State B in the capital city of State C 
(or even State A)-will be deemed an armed attack against State B, notwith-
standing the geographic disconnection from its territory. 52 This is also true of an 
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electronic attack against the computer system of State B's embassy in State C (or 
in State A) culminating with fatalities or destruction of property. 
The position differs when the target of an armed attack (kinetic or electronic) 
by State A is situated in State C, and any injury caused to State B or to its nation-
als is coincidental. In such a case, State B cannot regard itself as the genuine ob-
ject of the armed attack. On the other hand, if a destructive CNA is launched by 
State A within the territorial boundaries of State C (or even State A) against a 
computer system operated privately by nationals (individual or corporate) of 
State B-and the target is specifically selected on account of that national-
ity-State B is entitled to consider the act an armed attack against itseI£ Thus, if 
an eA'Plosion-inducing CNA strikes a computer operated by US citizens across 
the ocean-and this is plainly done not at random but because of the American 
nationality of the operators-the act may be deemed an armed attack against the 
US (although perpetrated abroad). There are many instances in international re-
lations in which nationals attacked abroad by State A have been protected or res-
cued by State B in the name of self-defense. 53 This is perfectly legitimate, 
provided that the attack occurred owing to the bond of nationality existing be-
tween the victims and State B. 54 Once more, there is no difference here between 
an electronic and a kinetic attack. 
Self-Defense Responses to CNAs 
Just as there are variable settings for the commission of an armed attack by 
State A in the form of a CNA, there are also several possible responses available 
to State B in the exercise ofits right of self-defense. The most obvious response is 
"on-the-spot reaction, "55 where the computer network under attack strikes in-
stantaneously back at the source of the CNA. The trouble, however, is that fre-
quently the server which is seemingly the source of the CNA has only been 
manipulated by the true assailants (who have routed their attack through it), and 
s\vift responsive counter-measures against the intermediary conduit is liable to 
be counterproductive, as well as unlawful. 56 Establishing the genuine identity of 
the attacker-and attributing the act to the real (as distinct from apparent) ac-
tor-is a major challenge in the present stage of technological development (see 
discussion infra). 
On the whole, the most effective modality of self-defense against an armed at-
tack in the shape of a CNA is recourse to defensive armed reprisals, to wit, forc-
ible counter-measures undertaken at a different time and place. Armed reprisals 
as such are generally" considered to be unlawful" in peacetime. 57 But there is no 
reason why armed reprisals cannot come within the framework of self-defense 
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under the Charter. Armed reprisals can constitute a legitimate response to an 
armed attack within the ambit of Article 51, provided that they are genuinely 
defensive, namely, future-oriented (deterrent in character) and not 
past-oriented (confined to punitive retaliation). 58 State practice definitely shows 
that defensive armed reprisals are part and parcel of the arsenal of States subjected 
to armed attacks. 59 Indeed, falling back on defensive armed reprisals has certain 
built-in advantages. Above all, it gives State B an opportunity to review the facts 
(and determine culpability) while considering options for response. 
It should be borne in mind that defensive armed reprisals against a CNA can 
be performed kinetically even though the original armed attack Gustifying them) 
was executed electronically, and vice versa. Again, whatever is permitted (or 
prohibited) when kinetic means of warfare are used is equally permitted (or pro-
hibited) when the means employed are electronic; the rules of international law 
are the same whatever the means selected for attack. 
The ultimate type offorce stimulated by self-defense may amount to (or may 
result in) war.60 In the setting of CNAs, the outbreak of war as a counter-
measure of self-defense would be rare. Due to the conditions precedent to the 
waging of war as an exercise of self-defense (see discussion infra), war would 
constitute a proper response to a CNA only in far-fetched scenarios (such as the 
calculated prompting of a nuclear core meltdown). 
Sometimes, State A-constrained by political or military consider-
ations-would passively tolerate the use of its territory as a base for activities by 
terrorists against State B, without actively sponsoring those activities or even en-
couraging them.61 Such a tum of events would not cloak the terrorists ,vith a 
mantle of protection from State B. "If a host country permits the use of its terri-
tory as a staging area for terrorist attacks when it could shut those operations 
down, an? refuses requests to take action, the host government cannot e},.-pect to 
insulate its territory against measures of self-defense. "62 As already epitomized in 
the classical Caroline incident of 1837,63 State B may legitimately invoke 
self-defense to exert counter-force within the territory of State A-targeting 
armed bands which use that territory as a springboard for operations against State 
B-when the host government remains inert. The present writer calls such a 
mode of self-defense "extra-territorial law enforcement,"64 while others prefer 
the term "state of necessity. "65 What counts, however, is the substance of the 
law and not the formal appellation. The substance of the law in this respect re-
lates to electronic, as much as kinetic, terrorism against State B originating in 
State A. 
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The Three Conditions of Self-Defense 
Three cumulative conditions to the exercise of self-defense are well-
entrenched in customary international law: (i) necessity, (ii) proportionality, and 
(iii) immediacy. The first two conditions were articulated in the 1986 Nicaragua 
]udgment,66 and reiterated in the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion.67 
Immediacy, while glossed over in the Court's rendering of the law, is of equal 
specific weight.68 
Necessity primarily denotes "the non-existence of reasonable peaceful alter-
native measures. "69 Differendy put, non-forcible remedies must either prove 
futile ill limine or have in fact been exhausted in an unsatisfactory manner; the 
upshot is that there is no effective substitute for the use offorce in self-defense. In 
the conteh1: of a CNA, it is requisite to ascertain that the CNA is no accident, to 
verify the genuine identity of the State-or non-State entity-conducting the 
attack (so as not to jeopardize innocent parties), and to conclude that the use of 
force as a counter-measure is indispensable. Should there be an opportunity to 
setde the matter amicably through negotiations, these must be conducted in 
good faith.70 
The second condition is chiefly relevant to defensive armed reprisals under-
taken in a situation "short of war." The counter-measures taken by State B 
(kinetically or electronically) must not be out of proportion with the act 
prompting them.71 A modicum of symmetry between force and coun-
ter-force-injury inflicted on State B by the armed attack versus damage sus-
tained by State A by dint of the self-defense counter-measures-is called for. 
Since CNAs are often discharged in a cluster-and inasmuch as each one of 
them, when examined in isolation, may appear to have only a minor 
("pin-prick") adverse effect, yet, when assessed in their totality, the results may 
be calamitous-the question is whether defensive armed reprisals may be under-
taken in proportion to the cumulative effect of the sequence of attacks. 72 The is-
sue, which ordinarily arises in the face of assaults by terrorists, is not free of 
difficulties.73 But there is some authority for the position that a State suffering 
from a series of small-scale attacks is permitted to respond to them aggregately in 
a single large-scale forcible counter-measure.74 This would equally apply to 
CNAs. 
The balance between the quantum of force and counter-force, which is the 
key to the legitimacy of defensive armed reprisals, is not germane to war as the 
ultimate manifestation of self-defense in response to an armed attack. 75 Once 
war is in progress, it may be fought to the limit (subject to the exceptions and 
qualifications decreed by international humanitarian law), and there is no 
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mandatory correspondence between the scale of force expended by the oppos-
ing sides. 76 The meaning of proportionality in the concrete circumstances of war 
is that the use of comprehensive counter-force in the exercise of self-defense 
must be warranted by the critical character of the original armed attack.77 Once 
the vital justification of a war of self-defense by State B against State A is recog-
nized, there is no additional need to ponder the defensive disposition of every 
single measure taken by State B. From the outset of a war of self-defense until its 
termination (which is not to be confused with the suspension of hostilities 
through a cease-fire78), the legitimacy of every instance of the use of force by 
State B against State A is covered by the jus ad bellum (albeit not necessarily by the 
jus in bello). Admittedly, where CNAs are concerned, a war of self-defense 
would be vindicated as an appropriate response only in outre circumstances (such 
as the catastrophic event of a CNA-induced nuclear core meltdown). 
Immediacy intrinsically suggests that the activation of self-defense counter-
measures must not be too tardy. Still, this condition is construed "broadly."79 
There may be a time-lag of days, weeks, and even months between the original 
armed attack and the sequel of self-defense. The delay may be particularly glar-
ing after a CNA, since in cyberspace activities can produce reverberations 
around the world "in the time that it takes to blink an eye."80 Still, lapse of time 
is almost unavoidable when-in a desire to fulfill the letter and spirit of the con-
dition of necessity-a slow process of diplomatic negotiations evolves, \vith a 
view to resolving the matter amicably.81 
Interceptive Self-Defense 
The gist of Article 51 of the Charter is that there is no legitimate self-defense 
sans an armed attack. All the same, an armed attack need not start with the open-
ing offire on the aggrieved party. In fact, at times, it is the victim of an armed at-
tack who fires the first shot. For an obvious example, suffice it to postulate that 
military formations commissioned by State A intentionally cross the frontier of 
State B and then halt, positioning themselves in strategic outposts well \vithin 
the territory of State B (the movement of Pakistani troops into Indian Kashmir 
in 1999 is a good case in point82). If the invasion takes place in a region not easily 
accessible and lightly guarded, it is entirely conceivable that some time would 
pass before the competent authorities of State B grasp what has actually tran-
spired. In these circumstances, it may very well ensue that the armed forces of 
State B would be instructed to dislodge from their positions the invading contin-
gents belonging to State A, and that fire be opened first by soldiers raising the 
banner of State B. Nevertheless, since the international frontier has been crossed 
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by the military units of State A without the consent of State B, State A cannot re-
lieve itself of responsibility for an armed attack. 
As a matter of fact (and law), an armed attack may be viewed as a foregone 
conclusion even though no fire has been opened (as yet) and no international 
frontier has been crossed. Thus, hypothetically, had the Japanese aircraft en 
route to Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, been intercepted and shot down 
over the high seas by US air forces,Japan would still have incurred responsibility 
for the armed attack that triggered the Pacific War.83 A more up-to-date sce-
nario would be that of a missile site whose radar is locked on to a target in prepa-
ration for fire.84 The linchpin question in analyzing any situation is whether the 
die has been cast. Resort to counter-force in the exercise of self-defense cannot 
be purely preventive in nature, inasmuch as threats alone do not form an armed 
attack. Still, ifit is blatant to any unbiased observer that an armed attack is incipi-
ent or is on the verge of beginning, the intended victim need not wait impo-
tently for the inescapable blow; the attack can legitimately be intercepted. 
Interceptive (in contradistinction to anticipatory) self-defense comes within the 
purview of permissible self-defense under the Charter. The theme of intercep-
tive self-defense is apposite to a CNA when an intrusion from the outside into a 
computer network has been discovered, although, as yet, it is neither lethal to 
any person nor tangibly destructive of property. The issue is whether the intru-
sion can plausibly be construed as the first step of an inevitable armed attack, 
which is in the process of being staged (analogous to the detection of attack air-
craft en route to their objectives). It is a matter of evaluation on the ground of the 
information available at the time of action (including warnings, intelligence re-
ports, and other data), reasonably interpreted.8S 
The Attribution of CNAs to a State 
Reference has already been made to the problem of attribution to State A of a 
CNA as an armed attack for which responsibility devolves on that State. As ob-
served, in the present state of the art, it is often by no means clear who originated 
the CNA. The inability to identify the attacker undermines in practice the theo-
retical entitlement of State B to resort to forcible counter-measures in self-
defense.86 State B must not rush headlong to hasty action predicated on reflexive 
impulses and unfounded suspicions; it has no choice but to withhold forcible re-
sponse until hard evidence is collated and the state of affairs is clarified, lest the 
innocent be endangered. However, the following points should be recalled: 
(i) The same problem arises in many other situations, for instance 
when acts of terrorism are committed kinetically. Frequently, 
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either the perpetrators of the terrorist attack act anony-
mously-leaving no signature-or those "taking credit" are unfa-
miliar. Since States sponsoring terrorism usually try to conceal their 
role: holding such States accountable for their misdeeds may be 
fraught with great difficulties.87 Prior to determining its options in 
combating terrorism, the victim State must establish a linkage be-
tween the terrorists and their sponsoring State.88 CNAs invite a 
similar approach. 
(ii) Not always is attribution shrouded in doubt for long. In the past, 
wars began with bombings and bombardments. In the future, they 
are increasingly likely to start with CNAs. But recourse to a CNA 
does not mean that the enemy wishes to remain incognito indefi-
nitely. It is within the realm of the possible that a CNA will be 
merely the precursor of a wave of later attacks, which will be 
mounted with traditional means and be easily traceable to an irre-
futable source. Hence, it would be a mistake to assume that a CNA 
inevitably manifests an attempt at deception and perfidy. The CNA 
may be designed merely to achieve surprise and cause temporary 
havoc, without trying to hide the identity of the perpetrator for a 
prolonged stretch of time. 
(iii) Future advances in technology are likely to make it much easier to 
identify the attacker, just as current-unlike past-technology en-
ables the immediate registration of the source of an incoming tele-
phone call (although, patendy, identification of that source does 
not conclusively establish which person is actually making the tele-
phone call; the same is true of the user of a computer). 
Collective Self-Defense 
Pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter, collective-no less than individ-
ual-self-defense is permissible against an armed attack. The rule does not dis-
criminate between different classes of armed attacks, and therefore it pertains 
inter alia to a CNA crossing the threshold of an armed attack. The right to collec-
tive self-defense means that any third State in the world89 (State C) is free to join 
State B in bringing forcible measures to bear against State A, with a view to re-
pelling an armed attack. The occurrence of an armed attack by State A against 
State B as a conditio sine qua non to the exercise of collective self-defense against 
State A by State C was underscored by the International Court of Justice in the 
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Nicaraglla case.90 The majority of the Court further held that State C may not ex-
ercise that right unless and until State B has first declared that it has been subjected 
to an armed attack by State A.91 This dictum has been cogendy challenged in a dis-
sent by Judge Jennings,92 but it may have some merit against the background of a 
CNA. Certainly, States B and C must see eye to eye on the identification of an 
elusive attacker. State C is enjoined from taking collective self-defense action 
against State A if State B (the immediate target) declines to confirm that State A is 
indeed accountable for a CNA constituting an armed attack. 
The exercise of collective self-defense in conformity with the Charter is a 
right and not a duty. The right can be transformed into a duty should States Band 
C become contracting parties to a mutual assistance treaty or a treaty of guarantee, 
and afortiori to a military alliance.93 Thus, if State B happens to be a member of 
NATO, other members of the alliance are expected to extend military aiCl when an 
armed attack occurs against it (within certain geographic bounds).94 But there is no 
need for a collective self-defense treaty to exist between State B and State C. 
State C is competent to act spontaneously~ppraising events as they unfold~nd 
it can do so whether the armed attack against State B is kinetic or electronic. 
The Supervision of the Security Council 
Article 51 of the Charter sets forth that the right of self-defense may be exer-
cised until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain in-
ternational peace and security. Under the article, a State invoking self-defense 
must immediately report to the Council what steps it has taken, and these steps 
do not diminish from the authority of the Council to take any action it deems 
necessary. As the International Court of Justice enunciated in the Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion, the "requirements of Article 51 apply whatever the 
means offorce used in self-defence."95 There is thus no difference between ki-
netic and electronic counter-measures. 
Three thorny aspects of the Security Council's supervisory powers deserve to 
be mentioned. First, as a matter off act, "[r]elatively few communications have 
been circulated expressly to meet the Charter obligation to report immediately 
to the Council on measures taken in the exercise of the right of individual or col-
lective self-defence after an armed attack has occurred (Article 51). "96 As a mat-
ter oflaw, however, a failure to report to the Security Council about engaging in 
self-defense against a CNA may be perilous. In its Judgment in the Nicaragua 
case, the majority of the Court implied that a State may be precluded from rely-
ing on the right of self-defense ifit fails to comply with the requirement of re-
porting to the Council.97 Judge Schwebel dissented, holding that the reporting 
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duty is a procedural matter and that therefore nonfeasance must not deprive the 
State concerned of its substantive cardinal right to self-defense.98 The dissent is 
quite persuasive, but the majority's position cannot simply be disregarded. 
Second, the Security Council's record since its inception is not such as to instill 
much confidence in the likelihood of its taking the necessary remedial action for 
the maintenance of international peace and security, thus avoiding any further 
need of unilateral self-defense against an armed attack. Once the Council's inac-
tion was largely due to the Cold War and the abuse of the veto power by Perma-
nent Members, each voting in tandem with the political interests of the bloc 
which it led or to which it belonged. Regrettably, even recent permutations in 
Big Power politics have not revived the faith in the Security Council's role as an 
above-the-fray arbiter of all armed conflicts in the international community. 
Third, it is by no means clear what sort of resolution adopted by the Security 
Council would-divest States of the right to embark upon unilateral use offorce in 
self-defense against an armed attack. Surely, the Council is fully empowered to 
override specious claims to self-defense and adopt a legally binding decision to the 
effect that allegedly defensive measures must stop forthwith. But this does not 
mean that "any measure" adopted by the Council "would preempt self-
defense."99 Short of an explicit decree by the Council to discontinue the use of 
force, the State acting in self-defense retains its right to do so until the Council has 
taken measures which have actually "succeeded in restoring international peace 
and security."100 Only effective measures that would not leave the victim State 
defenseless can terminate or suspend the exercise of the right of self-defense. 101 
Conclusion 
The introduction of any new weapon into the arsenal of inter-State conflict 
raises first and foremost the issue of its legality. pnder Article 36 of Additional 
Protocol I (of 1977) to the Geneva Conventions, any State adopting (or even 
developing) a new weapon must first determine whether or not it is prohibited 
by international law; 102 this norm appears to reflect customary international 
law. 103 CNAs are not incorporated in any present list of proscribed weapons un-
der the lex lata. Evidently, there is a separate issue de legeftrenda whether man-
kind would not be better offby legally banning them altogether. The dilemma 
will probably be debated with growing intensity as the incidence ofCNAs leaves 
their mark on the evolution of armed conflict. 
The novelty of a weapon-any weapon-always baffles statesmen and 
lawyers, many of whom are perplexed by technological innovations. It is 
perhaps natural to believe that a new weapon cannot easily intermesh ,vith the 
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pre-existing international legal system. In reality, after a period of gestation, it 
usually dawns on belligerent parties that there is no insuperable difficulty in ap-
plying the general principles and rules of international law to the novel weapon 
(subject to some adjustments and adaptations, which crystallize in practice). It 
can scarcely be denied that, unless legally excluded in advance, CNAs are almost 
bound to playa pivotal role as a first-strike weapon in the commencement offu-
ture hostilities. The challenge is to study now the most efficacious means of re-
sponse to this ominous prospect. 
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